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Abstract
First passage models, where corporate assets undergo a random walk and default
occurs if the assets fall below a threshold, provide an attractive framework for modeling
the default process. Recently such models have been generalized to allow a fluctuating
default threshold or equivalently a fluctuating total recovery fraction R. For a given
company a particular type of debt has a recovery fraction Ri that is greater or less than
R depending on its level of subordination. In general the Ri are functions of R and
since, in models with a fluctuating default threshold, the probability of default depends
on R there are correlations between the recovery fractions Ri and the probability of
default. We find, using a simple scenario where debt of type i is subordinate to debt of
type i − 1, the functional dependence Ri(R) and explore how correlations between the
default probability and the recovery fractions Ri(R) influence the par spreads for credit
default swaps. This scenario captures the effect of debt cushion on recovery fractions.
1 Introduction
The Merton framework [Merton (1974)] provides an attractive approach to credit risk,
relating default probabilities for corporations to their stock prices. The default process is
usually modeled by assuming that the corporate assets undergo a simple random walk and
the first time the assets fall below a threshold T default occurs [Black and Cox (1976),
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996), etc.]. A company may have several
types of debt, type i contributing Di to a total debt D (
∑
iDi = D). The debt holders
weighted, by debt fraction, average recovery fraction (i.e., total recovery fraction) R is
equal to T/D. If default occurred when the assets first passed a threshold equal to D then
the total recovery fraction would be one. However, the total recovery fraction is typically
considerably less than one and its precise value is not known until after the default actually
occurs. Hence the default threshold T or equivalently the total recovery fraction R should
be treated as a random variable. Recently first passage models have been generalized to
include a fluctuating recovery [Pan (2001), Finkelstein, et. al. (2002)]. Expected default
probabilities and par spreads ci for credit default swaps have been computed using a first
passage model with a fluctuating total recovery fraction R. The expected default probability,
PD(t), for example, is calculated by taking the usual first passage time expression PD(t|R)
and taking its expected value over possible values for R.
Since the recovery fraction for the i’th type of debt, Ri is not equal to R it is usually
treated as a fixed independent quantity in the calculation of par spread, ci for a default
swap on corporate bonds which form the i’th debt type1. This assumption neglects the
empirical observation that recovery fractions for different classes of bonds typically depend
strongly on the total recovery, and there is considerable uncertainty regarding the expected
recovery for each class. We argue that the Ri’s are actually functions of R and the main
purpose of this paper is to study the implications of this relationship for the pricing of
credit default swaps on different subordination classes of bonds. Clearly the Ri cannot be
completely independent of R. For example, since∑
i
RiDi = RD, (1)
if R and the Ri go between zero and one then R = 0 implies that all of the Ri are zero and
R = 1 then all of the Ri = 1.
In a simple scenario where debt of type i is subordinate to debt of type i − 1 we find
the functional dependence of the Ri on R and use it to compute the par credit default swap
spreads, ci. Since the default probability PD(t|R) depends on R and the recovery fractions
Ri now also depend on R there are correlations between these two quantities which play an
important role. We examine the significance of these correlations and find that they cause
a substantial decrease in default swap par spreads. The effect is very dramatic for the most
senior debt.
Debt cushion for debt of type i refers to the proportion of total debt occupied by those
junior to it [Van de Castle and Keisman (1999)]. The simple scenario we discuss in this
paper relates recovery fractions Ri to R in a way that incorporates the impact of debt
1For an excellent discussion on the treatment of recovery in various classes of models for credit risk see
Altman et. al. (2002).
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cushion on the pricing of credit default swap spreads and we find that expected recovery
rates increase substantially as the debt cushion increases.
2 Credit Default Swaps in a First Passage Model With Fluc-
tuating Default Threshold
We take the corporate assets Vt to undergo the Ito process,
dVt
Vt
= σdWt + µdt, (2)
where,
E
[
(dWt)
2
]
= dt (3)
and µ is the coefficient of a drift term. The stochastic process for log(Vt) is obtained using
Ito’s lemma
d (log Vt) = σdWt +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
dt, (4)
where log denotes the natural logarithm. Integrating over time
Vt = V0 exp
(
σWt +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
t
)
. (5)
In this paper, we set µ = 0 so that the expected value, E[Vt] is independent of time [Pan
(2001)].2 Default occurs if the assets Vt fall below a threshold T . If the total corporate debt
is D, the average recovery fraction weighted by debt fraction (i.e., total recovery fraction)
is R = T/D. Because the total recovery fraction is not known at the initial time, the
default threshold T or equivalently the total recovery fraction R is taken to be a random
variable with probability distribution P (R). The expected survival probability, PS(t), for
the fluctuating default threshold case results from weighting the standard (i.e., fixed default
threshold) first passage time expression with the probability distribution P (R). The survival
condition is Vt > T which implies that,
Wt − σ
2
t >
1
σ
log
(
RD
V0
)
. (6)
The survival probability can be deduced from the above condition since it simply leads to
a constant drift Brownian motion with an absorbing barrier. Introducing the convenient
notation to signify expectations of a quantity f(R) over the recovery probability density
function
〈f(R)〉 =
∫ 1
0
dRP (R)f(R), (7)
2For the purpose of pricing credit default swaps, one should use the risk-neutral measure dV = rVtdt−
Cdt + σdWt if the answer to the delicate question of Vt being a traded asset is affirmative. Here, r is the
risk-free interest rate and C arises from dividends and interest payments made on the debt. In this article,
we drop the drift terms r and C in order to concentrate on the effects of debt subordination and debt cushion
on the pricing of CDS.
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the expected survival probability is
PS(t) = 〈PS(t|R)〉 (8)
where
PS(t|R) = Φ
(
−B(R)√
t
− σ
√
t
2
)
− exp (−σB(R))Φ
(
B(R)√
t
− σ
√
t
2
)
. (9)
In equation (9)
B(R) = − 1
σ
log
(
V0
DR
)
(10)
and Φ is the cumulative normal distribution,
Φ(a) =
1√
2pi
∫ a
−∞
dx exp
(
−x
2
2
)
. (11)
Although there have been reports of recovery rates greater than unity, such events are
rare and untypical. Hence, we take the upper limit in the range of integration in equation
(7) to be R = 1. When V0/D is significantly greater than unity this causes an unrealistically
large suppression of default probabilities at small times. It is straightforward to extend the
results presented here to allow for R > 1.
The credit default swap par spread ci for a particular type of debt labelled by i can be
found by equating the expected loss due to the firm defaulting with the credit default swap
payments, which are assumed to be made continuously3. We have
ci =
〈
(1−Ri(R))
(
1− PS(0|R) −
∫ t
0 ds
∂PS(s|R)
∂s
e−rˆ(s)s
)〉
〈∫ t
0 dsPS(s|R)e−rˆ(s)s
〉 , (12)
where rˆ(s) is the spot rate of term s.
In the remainder of this section, we consider a simple scenario for the recovery rates
pertinent to different classes of debt at the point of default. Consider N different classes of
debts
Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ N (13)
in the descending order of seniority such that D1 is the most senior. We have the following
constraints on the debts:
N∑
i=1
Di = D, (14)
N∑
i=1
RiDi = RD. (15)
Under the current U.S. bankruptcy legislation, assets of a bankrupt firm are distributed to
its creditors according to the Absolute Priority Rule [Gupton and Stein (2002)]. Senior debt
3Equation (12) can be easily generalized to spread payments that are made discretely.
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holders are able to have a claim on the remaining assets before the junior holders can do
so. However, in practice the actual recovery rates may depend on a “plan” agreed upon by
the claimants. In this article, we apply the Absolute Priority Rule in its strictest sense. We
assume that senior holders, when given the chance, are able to claim up to the full recovery
rate at which point the next senior holder is able to stake a claim. For example, the most
senior holder’s recovery rate initially goes as R1 = RD/D1 then caps at 1. The next senior
debt holder is unable to recover any amount of the asset until R = D1/D, then he recovers
(RD −D1)/D2 until the recovery rate caps at 1. Repeating this argument, one can show
that for the i’th subordinate, the recovery fraction can be expressed as
Ri(R) = αi(R) [Θ (αi(R))−Θ(αi(R)− 1)] + Θ (αi(R)− 1) , (16)
αi(R) =
D
Di

R− i−1∑
j=1
(Dj/D)

 ,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N and R ∈ [0, 1]. Θ is the step function defined in the following manner:
Θ(x) =
{
1 if x ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
(17)
Obviously, the general expression for the credit default swap par spread ci given in equation
(12) can accommodate any form of the recovery rate as a function of the total recovery
rate on total debt. The scenario we consider with the recovery rates depending only on
the seniority of the debt and the level of debt cushion should prove useful in a general
framework for pricing credit default swaps.
3 Numerical Results
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Figure 1: P (R) from recovery distribution for years 1987 to 1997.
The total recovery rate for a company is correlated with the level of default activity
in the market and is dependent on numerous macroeconomic as well as company specific
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factors. In this paper, we only concentrate on the effect of seniority on the recovery rates
Ri. We take the total recovery rate to follow the lognormal probability distribution
P (R) =
6.48933 × 10−2
R9.20164
exp
(
−50
9
(log(R))2
)
, (18)
which was fit to recovery data from non-financial firms that defaulted from 1987 to 1997
[Finkelstein, et. al. (2002)]. Figure 1 plots P (R) in equation (18) as a function of R.
We consider a firm with initial asset to debt ratio of V0/D = 2, asset volatility σ = 0.4
and capital structure composed of three types of debt with, D1/D = 0.5, D2/D = 0.1 and
D3/D = 0.4. We have chosen the debt cushion for debt of type 1 to be 50% so that its
average recovery rate of 88% is significantly less than unity. For example, a debt cushion of
75% implies an average recovery rate 〈R1(R)〉 of nearly 100% and a 25% debt cushion yields
average recovery rate of 65%. If we identify debt of type 1 with bank loans, these average
recovery rates are in reasonable agreement with the results reported by Van de Castle and
Keisman (1999).
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Figure 2: Cumulative default probability (in percent) versus time (in years) with P (R)
given in Figure 1 and parameters V0/D = 2, σ = 0.4.
Using P (R) shown in Figure 1 its cumulative expected default probability, PD(t) =
1−PS(t), is plotted in Figure 2 as a function of time t. Note the suppression at small times.
For example, PD(1yr) is only 0.5%. As we remarked earlier this occurs because V0/D is
significantly greater than unity and fluctuations of R greater than 1 are forbidden.
The effect of debt subordination on the pricing of credit default swaps for this firm’s
debt is illustrated in Figure 3, where the par spreads, ci are plotted as a function of debt
maturity. The lower curve is for debt of type 1, middle curve for debt of type 2 and the
upper curve is for the least senior debt of type 3.
The correlations between recovery the rates Ri(R) and default probability PD(t|R) =
1− PS(t|R) are defined by
ξi(t) =
〈Ri(R)PD(t|R)〉 − 〈Ri(R)〉〈PD(t|R)〉√〈Ri(R)2〉 − 〈Ri(R)〉2√〈PD(t|R)2〉 − 〈PD(t|R)〉2 , (19)
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Figure 3: Annualized credit default spreads (in bps) versus maturity (in years) for D1/D =
0.5, D2/D = 0.1, D3/D = 0.4, V0/D = 2, rˆ(s) = 0.05 and σ = 0.4.
and they are plotted in Figure 4 as a function of time. The correlations are positive since
both the cumulative default probability PD(t|R) and the recovery fractions Ri(R) are in-
creasing functions of total recovery fraction R. These strong correlations lead to a substan-
tial reduction in par spreads for credit default swaps.
In Figure 5, we demonstrate the effect of including the correlation between Ri(R) and
PD(t|R) on the pricing of credit default swaps. The solid curve plots the ci’s with the
correlation included and the dotted curve plots the ci’s with Ri(R) in equation (12) set
to the constant expected recovery value 〈Ri(R)〉. The correlation substantially decreases
credit default par spread values. For example, with the parameters we have chosen the
cumulative 5yr default probability for the company is 23% and the par spread for a 5 yr
credit default swap on the type 2 debt is c2 = 232bp. However if R2(R) is replaced by
〈R2(R)〉 = 32% in equation (12), then one finds c2 = 322bp.
The effect of this correlation is more significant for the most senior type 1 debt. In that
case the recovery is one unless R has fluctuated below 0.5. The credit spread then only gets
a contribution from this region of R integration in equation (12). But for R in this region the
default probability is small resulting in a small credit default swap par spread. For example,
for a 5yr maturity default swap we find that c1 is only 29bp, however if R1(R) is replaced by
〈R1(R)〉 = 88% in equation (12) then one finds the much larger value c1 = 57bp. The very
large suppression of credit spreads for the most senior debt caused by the correlation between
Ri(R) and PD(t|R) may indicate a problem with the general picture where corporate assets
undergo a simple random walk in time, default occurs when the asset value first crosses a
threshold, the uncertainty of recovery is associated with universal fluctuations in the default
threshold and credit default swap spreads are computed by equating expected cash flows.
4 Conclusion
Within the context of a first passage default model with a fluctuating default threshold
we have explored the implications of the correlation between the recovery fraction for a
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Figure 4: Correlations ξi(t) of cumulative default probability and the recovery rates Ri.
The solid curve is for i = 1, short dashed i = 2 and the long dashed is for i = 3.
particular type of debt Ri(R) and the default probability PD(t|R) for the pricing of credit
default swaps.
A fluctuating default threshold is equivalent to a fluctuating total recovery rate R. In
general a company has several types of debtDi each with a different recovery rate Ri and the
total recovery rate satisfies RD =
∑
iRiDi, where D is the total debt. In a simple scenario
where debt of type i is subordinate to debt of type i−1, we explicitly derived the functional
relationship Ri(R). The impact of debt cushion on recovery rate has been known for some
time, and this scenario captures its effect on the pricing of credit default swap spreads.
Using a form for the probability of total recovery P (R) suggested by historical data, we
calculated par spreads ci for credit default swaps on corporate bonds with different levels
of subordination. We found that the correlation between Ri(R) and PD(t|R) dramatically
decreases the par spreads for credit default swaps and this effect is greatest for the most
senior debt.
As Figure 4 shows there is a positive correlation between recovery rates Ri(R) and
default probabilities PD(t|R) since both these quantities are increasing functions of the
total recovery fraction R. There is mounting empirical evidence for a negative correlation
between default probabilities and recovery rates [Frye (2000a), Frye (2000b), Altman (2001),
Carey and Gordy (2001), Hamilton et. al. (2001), and Altman and Brady (2002)]. However,
it is possible to accommodate this empirically observed behavior within the general class of
models we are discussing. For example, the default probability increases as σ does, and one
could introduce a correlation where companies with a larger asset volatility σ have a lower
mean default threshold. Even in such an extension of the model explicitly discussed in this
paper the functional dependence of the recovery rates for particular types of debt Ri on the
total recovery rate (on the total debt) R will play an important role in the correct pricing
of credit default swaps.
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Figure 5: Credit default spreads (in bps) versus maturity (in years) for 〈R1〉 = 0.88, 〈R2〉 =
0.32, 〈R3〉 = 0.06 with the same parameters as in Figure 1. Solid curve is with correlation
and dotted curve is without.
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